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A

BORTION has long been, and remains, the
most politicized medical procedure in the
United States. It has been the subject of more
state and federal legislation than all other medical procedures combined. The U.S. Supreme Court, which
almost never hears cases about medical procedures,
has regularly heard cases over the past 25 years concerning the constitutionality of various state laws designed to limit abortion. Thus, it was only a matter of
time before the Court would hear a case on the constitutionality of laws restricting so-called partial-birth
abortion.1 When the Court heard a challenge to Nebraska’s law, statutes relating to partial-birth abortion
had been enacted in 30 states, and two bills banning
such abortions had been passed by Congress. All the
appeals courts except one, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, had found these laws unconstitutional,
and the opinion of that court rested on an extremely
narrow interpretation of the law.2
The controversies surrounding partial-birth abortion are over how to describe the procedure and
whether physicians ever need to use it to protect the
health of a pregnant woman. The Supreme Court confronted these issues in the case of Stenberg v. Carhart
last summer.3
THE NEBRASKA PARTIAL-BIRTH
ABORTION LAW

The Nebraska law provides that “no partial birth
abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such
procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself.”4 Like the federal acts twice passed
by Congress and vetoed by President Bill Clinton,
the Nebraska law defined partial-birth abortion as “an
abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child
before killing the unborn child and completing the
delivery.” The law further defines the phrase “partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before
killing the unborn child” to mean “deliberately and
intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unFrom the Health Law Department, Boston University School of Public
Health, Boston.

born child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the
purpose of performing a procedure that the person
performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child.”4 Violation of the law is a felony that carries a prison term
of up to 20 years, a fine of up to $25,000, and automatic revocation of a medical license.
Dr. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions, sued in federal court to have the
law declared unconstitutional. U.S. District Court
judge Richard G. Kopf reviewed abortion procedures
in detail, using a drawing of female pelvic anatomy
as an attachment to his opinion, before holding that
the statute was unconstitutional because it endangered
women’s lives and health and was void for vagueness
because physicians could not know what conduct it
proscribed.5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the District Court ruling.6 By a fiveto-four vote, the Supreme Court ruled on June 28,
2000, that the Nebraska law and all other laws banning partial-birth abortion are unconstitutional.
THE MAJORITY DECISION

The opinion of the Court was written by Justice
Stephen Breyer, one of only two current justices (the
other is Ruth Bader Ginsburg) who had not previously expressed an opinion in a major decision about
abortion. The opinion is best understood as a direct
application to the Nebraska law of the principles articulated in the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade 7 and
the 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.8 In Roe the Court held
that because a woman’s right to privacy is “fundamental,” states must demonstrate a “compelling interest” in order to restrict abortion, and they are unable to demonstrate such an interest before the time
when the fetus becomes viable. Moreover, Roe made
it clear that the state could not favor the life of the
fetus over the life or health of the pregnant woman.
The Court in Casey affirmed the core holding of Roe,
that states cannot outlaw abortion before the time
of fetal viability and can do so thereafter only if the
woman’s life and health are protected. States were permitted, however, to regulate abortions so long as any
restriction did not impose an “undue burden” on the
pregnant woman’s liberty interest in terminating her
pregnancy.
The Nebraska ban applies throughout pregnancy
and has no exception to preserve a woman’s health.
Under Roe and Casey, the state of Nebraska had to
demonstrate that the state had at least a legitimate
interest in outlawing partial-birth abortions and that
doing so would not place an undue burden on women. Because it is a criminal statute, the legislature
had to be very clear about what exactly the statute
prohibited. In order to determine exactly what was
and was not prohibited, Justice Breyer, like the trial
court judge, devoted nearly the entirety of his opinion
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to describing various abortion procedures and comparing them with the language of the Nebraska law.
HOW ABORTIONS ARE PERFORMED

Justice Breyer introduced his descriptions of abortion procedures by stating that they may seem “clinically cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to
others,” but that he saw no other way “to acquaint
the reader with the technical distinctions among different abortion methods and related factual matters,
upon which the outcome of this case depends.” Breyer noted, among other facts, that 90 percent of abortions in the United States are performed before 12
weeks of gestation, and almost all the rest are performed between 12 and 24 weeks. Almost all second-trimester abortions are performed by means of
dilation and evacuation, with variations depending
on the stage of gestation. Breyer quoted a report from
the American Medical Association (AMA) as saying
that at 13 to 15 weeks of gestation, “D&E [dilation
and evacuation] is similar to vacuum aspiration except that the cervix must be dilated more widely because surgical instruments are used to remove larger
pieces of tissue.” After 15 weeks, the AMA report
continues, because of the increased size of the fetus
and the rigidity of its bones, “dismemberment or other destructive procedures are more likely to be required . . . to remove fetal and placental tissue.”
And after 20 weeks, “some physicians use intrafetal
potassium chloride or digoxin to induce fetal demise . . . to facilitate evacuation.”3
Breyer then made a series of observations and factual conclusions that determined the outcome of the
case. He found, first, that the various dilation-andevacuation procedures have in common the dilation
of the cervix, the removal of at least some fetal tissue
with the use of surgical instruments, and (after the
15th week) the potential need for dismemberment of
the fetus. When dismemberment does occur, it typically occurs “as the doctor pulls a portion of the fetus through the cervix into the birth canal.” Breyer
noted that a variation of dilation and evacuation,
which the physicians who testified at the trial referred
to as “intact D&E” or dilation and extraction, is used
at 16 weeks at the earliest, when vacuum aspiration is
ineffective and the fetal skull is too large to pass
through the cervix. Dilation and extraction may proceed in two ways: if the fetus presents head first, the
physician collapses the skull and then extracts the intact fetus through the cervix; if there is a breech presentation, the physician pulls the fetal body through the
cervix, then collapses the skull, and then extracts the
fetus.3
On the basis of information from medical textbooks
and the position taken by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists,9 Breyer concluded
that “intact D&E and D&X [dilation and extraction]
are sufficiently similar for us [the Court] to use the

terms interchangeably.” There are no accurate statistics
available on the number of dilation-and-extraction
abortions performed in the United States, and Breyer
cited estimates ranging from 640 to 5000 cases per
year. He found that such abortions are performed
for a variety of reasons, including reducing the danger caused by the passage of sharp bone fragments
through the cervix, minimizing the number of surgical instruments used (and thereby decreasing the likelihood of uterine perforation), reducing the likelihood
of infection, and helping to ensure the removal of all
fetal tissue. Dilation and extraction is also the preferred
method for fetuses with hydrocephaly and anomalies
incompatible with fetal survival.3
All this was much more detail about a medical
procedure than had ever appeared before in a Supreme
Court opinion. The factual conclusions, however, were
necessary to answering the two major constitutional
questions posed by Nebraska’s ban: Must a law prohibiting the use of a medical procedure for abortion
contain an exception to protect the health of the
pregnant woman as defined in Roe? And does the
Nebraska law “unduly burden” a woman’s right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy as defined in Casey?
Justice Breyer’s answer to both of these questions
was yes.
WOMEN’S HEALTH

Justice Breyer recited the rule, as stated in Roe v.
Wade, that a state may outlaw abortion after the fetus
is viable in order to promote its interest in protecting potential human life, “except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Breyer
logically concluded that if Roe requires an exception
for the mother’s health after fetal viability, it must
require one before viability, when the state has less
of an interest in protecting fetal life.
Would the ban in fact adversely affect the health
of pregnant women who want to terminate their pregnancies? Breyer concluded that it would, on the basis
of the belief of “significant medical authority” that “in
some circumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure.” Breyer found especially persuasive the brief to
the Court in which the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists stated specifically that dilation and extraction “may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save
the life or preserve the health of a woman.”3,9 Nebraska relied on a contrary statement of the AMA that
“there does not appear to be any identified situation
in which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure
to induce abortion.”3
Breyer rejected the argument that the word “necessary,” as used in the opinion Planned Parenthood
v. Casey — “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother”8 — means an “absolute necessity” or requires
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“absolute proof.” He concluded that the words “‘appropriate medical judgment’ must embody the judicial need to tolerate responsible differences of medical opinion.” Breyer, who has special expertise in
administrative law and risk assessment, went on to say
that “the division of medical opinion about the matter at most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the
presence of risk, not its absence.” He concluded that
“where substantial medical authority supports the
proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women’s health, Casey requires
the statute to include a health exception when the
procedure is ‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.’”3
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DILATION
AND EXTRACTION AND DILATION
AND EVACUATION

The second constitutional issue was whether the
statute imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s
liberty to terminate her pregnancy before the fetus
was viable. The answer to this question depended on
whether the statute was precisely written so as to apply only to the rare dilation-and-extraction procedures
and not to the more routine dilation-and-evacuation
procedures as well. On the basis of the statute’s descriptions of the procedure, Breyer concluded that
its language “does not track the medical differences
between D&E and D&X.”
Breyer stated that it would have been a simple
matter for the state legislature to provide an exception for dilation-and-evacuation procedures, but given the medical material he quoted in his opinion, it
is difficult to see how this could be effectively done.
The attorney general of Nebraska, for example, argued unpersuasively that the two procedures were
actually distinguished by the words “substantial portion” of the fetus, which the attorney general interpreted as meaning “the child up to the head” and
thus not including “a fetal arm or leg or anything less
than the entire fetal body.” Because of the vagueness
of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that the statute threatened physicians who would otherwise perform dilation-and-evacuation procedures, but who
would not now perform them because they would
“fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment.”
This results in placing “an undue burden on a woman’s right to make an abortion decision.”
THE CONCURRING OPINIONS

Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor,
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg each wrote brief concurring opinions. Stevens emphasized that the extent of
the rhetoric surrounding abortion often obscures the
fact that, during the past 27 years, the core holding
of Roe v. Wade “has been endorsed by all but 4 of the
17 justices who have addressed the issue.” He also

argued (persuasively, I think) that “the notion that
either of these two equally gruesome procedures [dilation and extraction and dilation and evacuation after
15 weeks] performed at this late stage of gestation
is more akin to infanticide than the other, or that the
State furthers any legitimate interest by banning one
but not the other, is simply irrational.” Justice O’Connor agreed with Breyer but added that she thought
“a ban on partial-birth abortion that only proscribed
the D&X method of abortion and that included an
exception to preserve the life and health of the mother would be constitutional.” Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Nebraska law would “not save any
fetus from destruction” nor “protect the lives or
health of pregnant women” and that therefore the
state had no legitimate interest in enacting it.3 She
also cited Chief Judge Richard Posner, who had made
this point in an extremely cogent dissent to the opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court. “These statutes,”
wrote Posner, “are not concerned with saving fetuses . . . [or] with protecting the health of women. . . . They are concerned with making a statement
in an ongoing war for public opinion. . . . The statement is that fetal life is more important than women’s health.”2
THE DISSENTING OPINIONS

There are four dissenting opinions, the two major
ones written by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas; Chief Justice William Rehnquist joined
both of them, and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the
Thomas dissent. Justice Kennedy objected to the majority’s use of medical textbooks and terminology to
describe abortion procedures, arguing that this technical language “views the procedures from the perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when confronted with
a new method of ending human life . . . [and] may
obscure matters for persons not trained in medical
terminology.” He did not refer to physicians as physicians, instead calling them “abortionists,” and proceeded to describe the dilation-and-extraction procedure
in lay terms. His version included such descriptions
as the following: “with only the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the abortionist tears open the skull
[using] . . . a pair of scissors.”3 Kennedy concluded
that permitting an exception to preserve the health
of the woman would be the equivalent of forbidding
Nebraska to ban partial-birth abortion. In his words,
“A ban which depends on ‘the appropriate medical
judgment’ of Dr. Carhart is no ban at all.”3
Kennedy’s central argument was that under Casey,
states “have an interest in forbidding medical procedures which, in the State’s reasonable determination,
might cause the medical profession or society as a
whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life,
including life in the human fetus.” But this argument
could apply to all abortions, and it is not, in fact,
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what Casey held. Moreover, he argued that it is irrelevant that the majority of the justices cannot see the
difference between dilation and evacuation and dilation and extraction. “The issue is not whether members of the judiciary can see a difference between the
two procedures,” Kennedy wrote. “It is whether
Nebraska can.” Regardless of whether physicians can
distinguish between legal and illegal medical procedures, Kennedy argued that the state of Nebraska
has a “right to declare a moral difference” between
two medical procedures.
Kennedy also believes that there is a real difference, arguing, for instance, that “D&X perverts the
natural birth process to a greater degree than D&E,
commandeering the live birth process until the skull
is pierced”; that the fetus is “killed outside of the
womb”; and that dilation and extraction bears a
“stronger resemblance to infanticide.” Finding that
the state has a legitimate interest in outlawing this
abortion procedure, Kennedy then argued that the
Court has no medical expertise sufficient to secondguess the Nebraska legislature on its determination
that abortion by dilation and extraction is no safer
than other methods of abortion and is therefore never
medically necessary. In this view, outlawing dilationand-extraction abortions (which Kennedy believes are
the only type affected by the statute) would deprive
no woman of access to a safe abortion, and thus cannot, under the terms set forth by Casey, place an undue burden on the pregnant woman.
Justice Thomas, like Kennedy, was upset by Breyer’s
“sanitized” medical descriptions, noting that since
Roe, “this Court has never described the various methods of aborting a second- or third-trimester fetus.”
Thomas also argued that the statute’s plain language
can and should be interpreted as including only abortions by dilation and extraction, and not by dilation
and evacuation. To the argument that “partial-birth
abortion” is not a medical term, he replied simply
and accurately, “There is, of course, no requirement
that a legislature use terminology accepted by the
medical community.” Thomas disagreed that the state
cannot second-guess physicians who believe use of a
particular abortion method is necessary to preserve
a woman’s health. He argued that the majority opinion “eviscerates Casey’s undue burden standard and
imposes unfettered abortion on demand.” In his view,
the resolution of differences among physicians regarding the safety of abortion procedures should be left to
the state legislatures.3 The dissenters, in short, do not
believe that physicians can be trusted to make goodfaith decisions about the health of their patients.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AFTER STENBERG

The majority opinion in Stenberg demonstrates that
five justices take Roe v. Wade and Casey seriously. By
applying the basic principles of these decisions, the
majority found the Nebraska statute unconstitution-

al for the following reasons: because it would place
an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an
abortion, as such a burden is defined in Casey; because it is so vague, in that it might be interpreted
as applying to dilation and evacuation and might thus
intimidate physicians, who might therefore not perform them; and because the statute provided no exception for protecting the health of the woman, as
required by Roe. Thus, in this opinion, five justices
strongly reaffirmed Roe and Casey.
The somewhat surprising vote, and the one that
has caused pro-choice commentators the most concern, was that of Justice Kennedy, one of the three
justices who wrote the joint opinion in Casey (the
others are Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter).8,10 Kennedy stated that the Nebraska law did not
impose an undue burden on women as defined by
Casey, whereas O’Connor and Souter found that it
did. Does this mean that Kennedy might change his
mind about the Casey decision and vote to overrule
it along with Roe v. Wade at some future time? No one
can say for sure. But I do not believe that such a
conclusion can be drawn from this case. In Stenberg,
because five justices upheld Roe and Casey, Kennedy
could express his own moral outrage at partial-birth
abortion — and support Nebraska’s right to express
its moral outrage — without having his personal views
change the outcome of the case or the constitutional
status of either Roe or Casey.
The result in Stenberg was determined by Roe and
Casey. Justice O’Connor may be correct in noting
that it would be possible to craft a statute that meets
constitutional requirements. But given the medical
facts, such a statute would probably not apply to any
patient in the real world. In my view, there is little
likelihood that redrafted statutes will be the centerpiece of antiabortion activity at the state or federal
level after this opinion. On the other hand, antiabortion forces will most likely renew their efforts to
change the composition of the Court by lobbying for
the appointment of justices with strong antiabortion
stances.
Physicians should take comfort from the Court’s
strong protection of the application of medical judgment. In this regard, the opinion can be seen as reflecting Roe v. Wade’s strong endorsement of the
privacy of the physician–patient relationship and the
right of women and their physicians to make decisions about abortion.11 The opinion reflects this endorsement by focusing much more attention on physicians and the medical techniques they use than it
does on women and their lives and liberty. This focus was necessary because the statute under review
aimed to restrict medical practice. Casey, on the other
hand, dealt with restrictions of women’s autonomy
and therefore centered more on women, whose constitutional rights were directly at stake. The opinion’s
emphasis on physicians may also explain why Dr. Car-
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hart entitled his presentation last October to an audience of Harvard medical students “Partial-Birth
Abortion, the Supreme Court, and Physician Autonomy,” as well as why he personally remains a target
of antiabortion forces.12
MEDICINE AND ABORTION

A deeper discussion of the availability of safe abortions to protect women’s lives and liberty may be too
much to ask of the Supreme Court. Maybe, in the debate over abortion, we are all past the point at which
facts and logic matter. As the decision in Stenberg
underlines, the law can determine whether abortions
are permitted, but only physicians — with their patients — can determine how they may be performed
safely. Ultimately, the central question regarding abortion remains who should make the decision: the state
or women and their physicians together. The answer
of the Supreme Court, as articulated in Roe v. Wade
and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,13 and now
strongly reinforced in Stenberg, is that the decision

belongs to the woman and her physician together. In
this respect, the Court has been remarkably consistent in all the abortion cases it has heard.
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